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ABSTRACT We analyzeoptimalmonetary policy and its implications for asset prices when aggregate demand has inertia. If there is a negative output gap, the central bank optimally overshoots aggregate asset prices (above their steady‐state levels consistent with current potential output). Overshooting leads to a temporary disconnect between the performance of financial markets and the real economy, but accelerates the recovery. When there is a lower bound constraint on the discount rate, good macroeconomic news is better news for asset prices when the output gap is more negative. Finally, we document that during the COVID‐19 recovery, the policy‐induced overshooting was large. 

We build a model in which the Fed and the market disagree about future aggregate demand. The market anticipates monetary policy “mistakes,” which affect current demand and induce the Fed to partially accommodate the market’s view. The Fed expects to implement its view gradually. Announcements that reveal an unexpected change in the Fed’s belief provide a microfoundation for monetary policy shocks. Tantrum shocks arise when the market misinterprets the Fed’s belief and overreacts to its announcement. Uncertainty about tantrums motivates further gradualism and communication. Finally, disagreements affect the market’s expected inflation and induce a policy trade-off similar to “ cost-push” shocks. (JEL D83, E12, E31, E43, E44, E52, E58) 

Abstract We theoretically investigate the interaction of endogenous risk intolerance and monetary policy following a large recessionary shock. As asset prices dip, risk-tolerant agents’ wealth share declines. This decline reduces the market’s risk tolerance and triggers a downward loop in asset prices and aggregate demand when the interest rate policy is constrained. In this context, large-scale asset purchases are effective because they transfer unwanted risk to the government’s balance sheet. These effects are sizable when the model is calibrated to match the estimates of aggregate asset demand inelasticity. The COVID-19 shock illustrates the environment we seek to capture. 

Abstract We provide a continuous-time “risk-centric” representation of the New Keynesian model, which we use to analyze the interactions between asset prices, financial speculation, and macroeconomic outcomes when output is determined by aggregate demand. In principle, interest rate policy is highly effective in dealing with shocks to asset valuations. However, in practice monetary policy faces a wide range of constraints. If these constraints are severe, a decline in risky asset valuations generates a demand recession. This reduces earnings and generates a negative feedback loop between asset prices and aggregate demand. In the recession phase, average beliefs matter because they not only affect asset valuations but also determine the strength of the amplification mechanism. In the ex ante boom phase, belief disagreements (or heterogeneous asset valuations) matter because they induce investors to speculate. This speculation exacerbates the crash by reducing high-valuation investors’ wealth when the economy transitions to recession, which depresses (wealth-weighted) average beliefs. Macroprudential policy that restricts speculation in the boom can Pareto improve welfare by increasing asset prices and aggregate demand in the recession.